Re: TSC Meeting agenda (Org focus) - Wed, 12/2/2020
Shuah Khan
On 12/1/20 11:05 AM, Paoloni, Gabriele wrote:
Hi ShuahYes please add them as suggested edits. Please do suggested edits for changes. One more thing that needDo you want us to comment/modify the file before tomorrow's meeting to be outlined is how WGs fit in these goals and interactions between WGs for goals. The idead being the graphic will be goal driven with WGs feeding into these goals. After our meeting, I will try to put a visual for this doc. thanks, -- Shuah
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Re: TSC Meeting agenda (Org focus) - Wed, 12/2/2020
Paoloni, Gabriele
Hi Shuah
toggle quoted messageShow quoted text
Many thanks for scheduling this discussion
-----Original Message-----Today in the safety arch WG we discussed over a qualification flow that I presented. It is just a starting point but maybe can be helpful do define part of the 'What' and part of the 'How': https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uss9FVcEIF8ecJftD0mv6pJY7mHue9DS/view?usp=sharing Do you want us to comment/modify the file before tomorrow's meeting or you want us to go over it altogether tomorrow? Thanks Gab --------------------------------------------------------------------- INTEL CORPORATION ITALIA S.p.A. con unico socio Sede: Milanofiori Palazzo E 4 CAP 20094 Assago (MI) Capitale Sociale Euro 104.000,00 interamente versato Partita I.V.A. e Codice Fiscale 04236760155 Repertorio Economico Amministrativo n. 997124 Registro delle Imprese di Milano nr. 183983/5281/33 Soggetta ad attivita' di direzione e coordinamento di INTEL CORPORATION, USA This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review or distribution by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender and delete all copies.
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TSC Meeting agenda (Org focus) - Wed, 12/2/2020
Shuah Khan
All,
Here is the agenda for tomorrow's meeting: Review pending action items Workshop #6 Planning ELISA Strategy As for strategy, the goal is coming up with a clear higher level definition first and them map the WGs activities and how each of these activities feed into the overall strategy. Note: I reviewed the existing slides on strategy, none of them is speaking to me as they dive right into WGs without a clear definition of higher level goals. I started a high level strategy doc seeding it with distilled ideas from Paul Albertella's thread on this topic and grouping them in "What" and "How". Thanks Paul for starting the thread. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Jx77Mw_BqdanGYILCkyw3Fdifxn7FO7Dmt-9ZU2KISo/edit# thanks, -- Shuah
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ELISA TSC Meeting - Wed, 12/02/2020 3:00pm-4:00pm
#cal-reminder
devel@lists.elisa.tech Calendar <devel@...>
Reminder: ELISA TSC Meeting When: Wednesday, 2 December 2020, 3:00pm to 4:00pm, (GMT+01:00) Europe/Amsterdam Where:https://zoom.us/j/97628705664?pwd=UVJnTjFHank1cHdNZ04vbWlSUGs5QT09 Organizer: ELISA Project Description:
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Re: Kernel Configurations in the Tool Investigation and Code Improvement Subgroup
On Tue, Dec 1, 2020 at 12:38 PM Elana Copperman
<Elana.Copperman@mobileye.com> wrote: Thanks, Elana. This will be our strategy. We will start tracking and fixing all new bugs on tinyconfig for a small selection of tools, which should be doable by the current group (I think it is doable with a few hours of work each week). Then, we continue to add selectively more functionality and code that we can handle, if the group of participants grows. Lukas
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Re: Kernel Configurations in the Tool Investigation and Code Improvement Subgroup
elana.copperman@...
Following initial discussion with Lukas, here is a summary of some relevant guidelines:
Elana
From: devel@... <devel@...> on behalf of Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...>
Sent: Monday, November 30, 2020 2:01 PM To: devel@... <devel@...> Subject: [ELISA Technical Community] Kernel Configurations in the Tool Investigation and Code Improvement Subgroup Dear all,
In the last meeting, it was requested to share the kernel configurations the Tool Investigation and Code Improvement Subgroup is using. We currently use: - x86-64 tinyconfig: this can be created with 'make tinyconfig' for initial investigations of tools (to get a small overview of the number of findings on a very small config.) - x86-64 defconfig without DRM, SOUND, USB for the CI system. You can obtain the config with: for clang-analyzer: make CC=clang defconfig scripts/config -d CONFIG_DRM scripts/config -d CONFIG_SOUND scripts/config -d CONFIG_USB_SUPPORT for smatch: make defconfig scripts/config -d CONFIG_DRM scripts/config -d CONFIG_SOUND scripts/config -d CONFIG_USB_SUPPORT If you have any feedback on this kernel configuration, please let us know. As of now, it looks like a manageable code base to continue our investigations. Best regards, Lukas
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ELISA Workshop #6 Topic Idea - Code Coverage analysis for GLibC
Gurvitz, Eli (Mobileye)
Hi,
- Topic idea: Structural coverage analysis is required by Safety standards and that includes Linux and GLibC. Building GLibC with instrumentation for code coverage analysis (gcov) was not possible in previous versions and is still tricky now. In this presentation we will describe the process of instrumenting glibc for coverage and the patch to GLibC that we uploaded. We will also show a hands-on example. -This work was done as an ELISA mentorship project.
- What you hope to accomplish in the session: * Share the knowledge about how to instrument GLibC for coverage * Provide a hands-on example of how this is done.
- Any critical participants needed for the discussion – * Eli Gurvitz * Ashutosh Pandey
Thanks, Eli Gurvitz
--------------------------------------------------------------------- This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential material for
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ELISA Workshop #6 - Topic proposal - Intel's Linux Test Robot
Gurvitz, Eli (Mobileye)
Hi,
- Topic idea: * Oliver Sang and Philip Li from Intel will present Intel’s Linux Test Robot (LKP) - https://01.org/lkp/
- What you hope to accomplish in the session: * Introduce the ELISA community to the Intel LKP project * Consider how Intel’s reports can be used in the field of Safety * Consider cooperation and contribution by ELISA members to LKP
- Any critical participants needed for the discussion -
Thanks, Eli Gurvitz --------------------------------------------------------------------- This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential material for
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REMINDER: ELISA Workshop #6 Dates Survey - Please Complete by Tuesday, December 1st
Min Yu
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Kernel Configurations in the Tool Investigation and Code Improvement Subgroup
Dear all,
In the last meeting, it was requested to share the kernel configurations the Tool Investigation and Code Improvement Subgroup is using. We currently use: - x86-64 tinyconfig: this can be created with 'make tinyconfig' for initial investigations of tools (to get a small overview of the number of findings on a very small config.) - x86-64 defconfig without DRM, SOUND, USB for the CI system. You can obtain the config with: for clang-analyzer: make CC=clang defconfig scripts/config -d CONFIG_DRM scripts/config -d CONFIG_SOUND scripts/config -d CONFIG_USB_SUPPORT for smatch: make defconfig scripts/config -d CONFIG_DRM scripts/config -d CONFIG_SOUND scripts/config -d CONFIG_USB_SUPPORT If you have any feedback on this kernel configuration, please let us know. As of now, it looks like a manageable code base to continue our investigations. Best regards, Lukas
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Re: [EXT] [ELISA Technical Community] Maintainers Expectations vs. Maintainers Reality: An Analysis of Organisational and Maintenance Structure of the Linux Kernel
On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 5:11 PM Ralf Ramsauer
<ralf.ramsauer@oth-regensburg.de> wrote: Agree. I need to add that Pia's work is good research work per the following definition: Every good research work raises many more new relevant research questions while answering a first clear research question at hand. And here we need more people/students/industry partners (collaboration projects) funding research institutes to follow up on those points. As you made clear, there are some further points to consider... I would like to add that some simple properties in MAINTAINERS are obviously not clean, e.g., 10% of the files in the repository do not even have a section they belong to (other than THE REST). So, any change to only any of those files would lead immediately to a 'process violation' according to the definition above. Ralf, I think we actually kicked off many years ago and are workingYes, we lack such a clear statement. Upstream Kernel lacks a clear for many years now, but others that state interest have not joined yet ;) Lukas
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Re: [EXT] [ELISA Technical Community] Maintainers Expectations vs. Maintainers Reality: An Analysis of Organisational and Maintenance Structure of the Linux Kernel
Ralf Ramsauer
Hi,
On 23/11/2020 11:14, Lukas Bulwahn wrote: Dear all,Let me add, by manual investigation, we found some patterns within "wrongly integrated" patches. Just to give a concrete example, Jakub Kicinski started to integrate patches for NETWORKING, before David Miller added him as maintainer. And Jakub has a long history of writing code. So to some degree, it's reasonable what was happening. Another example: A employee at Broadcom committed code for another device of Broadcom, while violating MAINTAINERS. Again, reasonable to some degree. At least the code was publicly discussed before integration. From a formal standpoint, these are "violations" of the integration process, depending on a definition of how patch integration actually should/must work. This is exactly why we started to dig deeper and tried to get an overview of what Kernel subsystems actually exist, the second part of Pia's work. Sections in the MAINTAINERS are tightly coupled to the file structure of the kernel, and sections in the MAINTAINERS overlap. Our assumption is that sections with high overlap build "clusters" of responsibility - or, IOW, subsystems. And if you check if a patch was integrated by a person within a subsystem, then the ratio will likely be higher than 80% - but we haven't done that yet. Yes, we lack such a clear statement. Upstream Kernel lacks a clear definition as well: Official documentation states that get_maintainers.pl can be helpful for finding recipients, otherwise AKPM is the last resort. That's all in the official submission guide. We need two definitions: Who should be addressed by the author, and who should finally be in charge of integrating a patch. MAINTAINERS provides answers for both questions. Don't forget that MAINTAINERS is an emerging document. $ git log --since=2020-01-01 --until=2020-07-01 \ --pretty=format:%H MAINTAINERS | wc -l 739 That's a lot of changes, and provides some factors of uncertainty. For example, if we check if a patch was addressed correctly, we pick the state of MAINTAINERS that corresponds with the Date header of the mail with the patch. Yet we don't know which version the author chose. Maybe the committer was correct at the moment of integration? Unlikely, but possible. It's hard to quantify... Of course, there's a reason why there is a MAINTAINERS. I guess we can agree that it would be worse without. And at the moment we have nothing to compare with: is 80% rather high or low? For another ongoing large-scale study, we had a look at a dozen of other projects besides Linux. And there exist (especially userland) projects that you even might ship in your products, where the vast majority of commits have never been seen on any list and have never been reviewed by anyone else but the author - contrary to the submission guidelines of the project and confirmed by maintainers. :-) So my hypothesis is that "sticking to development guidelines" and "software quality" strongly correlates with the privilege level of the processor where the software executes. Thanks! Sorry for not kicking off yet, so much work, so little time... Ralf
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Re: [ELISA Development Process WG] [ELISA Technical Community] Maintainers Expectations vs. Maintainers Reality: An Analysis of Organisational and Maintenance Structure of the Linux Kernel
elana.copperman@...
Good luck!
An interesting note would be to compare your results to the evidences of process compliance in non-open source (commercial) software development.
And resulting implications for quality.
Interesting indeed.
Regards
Elana
From: development-process@... <development-process@...> on behalf of Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...>
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 1:25 PM To: Paul Albertella <paul.albertella@...> Cc: devel@... <devel@...>; development-process@... <development-process@...>; Pia Eichinger <pia.eichinger@...>; Ralf Ramsauer <ralf.ramsauer@...>; Wolfgang Mauerer <wolfgang.mauerer@...> Subject: Re: [ELISA Development Process WG] [ELISA Technical Community] Maintainers Expectations vs. Maintainers Reality: An Analysis of Organisational and Maintenance Structure of the Linux Kernel On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 12:17 PM Paul Albertella
<paul.albertella@...> wrote: > > > > On 23/11/2020 10:14, Lukas Bulwahn wrote: > > So... I guess the Evidence Working Group has created yet another work > > result, even without kicking off... :) Paul, I certainly appreciate if > > you would like to continue the investigation of these evidence > > together with me (and maybe, Ralf and Wolfgang) and future prospective > > bachelor and master students. > > Yes, I'd like to do that :-) Let us get started then... :) > > This is a good example of Process vs Policy vs Practice (see my previous > post [1]), where Practice (as shown by Evidence), does not necessarily > comply with a Policy (partially documented in this case by MAINTAINERS), > perhaps because a Process (a description of the steps that should inform > Practice, and the order in which they may occur) is not clearly defined. > > A question we might ponder: if we can make the Policy more explicit and > enforce it by automation (e.g. a script to check that compliance), then > perhaps a documented Process is less important... > ...in the end, the result of clear Policy, Process and Practice matching each other is more "trustable software"... Lukas
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Re: Maintainers Expectations vs. Maintainers Reality: An Analysis of Organisational and Maintenance Structure of the Linux Kernel
On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 12:17 PM Paul Albertella
<paul.albertella@codethink.co.uk> wrote: Let us get started then... :) ...in the end, the result of clear Policy, Process and Practice matching each other is more "trustable software"... Lukas
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Re: [ELISA Development Process WG] Maintainers Expectations vs. Maintainers Reality: An Analysis of Organisational and Maintenance Structure of the Linux Kernel
On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 11:47 AM Elana Copperman
<Elana.Copperman@mobileye.com> wrote: Interesting definition of software quality... 80% compliance for a voluntary community is quite amazing. I wonder what comparable rates would be for commercial software development entities with mandatory processes - based on intuition only (no evidences yet) from my long-term experience, I would not guess the compliance rate to be as high as 80%. But then again, an interesting point for comparison.Yes, that is the challenge of interpretation of such data... what does "good" actually mean and what is "good enough"? Elana, what do you mean with "voluntary"? Where is the evidence that the changes and work is done on a voluntary basis and accepted on a voluntary basis? In practice, this means we only see here the opening shot. More evidences to be collected and analyzed. But indeed, a very interesting starting point.Agree. The interpretation of such data needs people with an overall good kernel community and kernel development understanding and long-term involvement (certainly longer than just a few weeks); hence, an Evidence working group that slowly learns how to interpret such data and starts to educate themselves in this area. Lukas
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Re: Maintainers Expectations vs. Maintainers Reality: An Analysis of Organisational and Maintenance Structure of the Linux Kernel
On 23/11/2020 10:14, Lukas Bulwahn wrote:
So... I guess the Evidence Working Group has created yet another workYes, I'd like to do that :-) This is a good example of Process vs Policy vs Practice (see my previous post [1]), where Practice (as shown by Evidence), does not necessarily comply with a Policy (partially documented in this case by MAINTAINERS), perhaps because a Process (a description of the steps that should inform Practice, and the order in which they may occur) is not clearly defined. A question we might ponder: if we can make the Policy more explicit and enforce it by automation (e.g. a script to check that compliance), then perhaps a documented Process is less important... Cheers, Paul [1] https://lists.elisa.tech/g/development-process/message/582
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Re: [ELISA Development Process WG] Maintainers Expectations vs. Maintainers Reality: An Analysis of Organisational and Maintenance Structure of the Linux Kernel
elana.copperman@...
Very interesting work, Lukas - thanks for bringing to our attention.
And there is certainly plenty of work to follow up.
Actually - I find the results to be quite complimentary. Given the open-source mindset and heavy reliance on voluntary contributions, the findings are actually better than my expectations.
As noted by Pia (page 22):
Our analysis shows that a high ratio of all recent patches was not integrated according to process, even though the majority was. This does not implicitly mean that 20% of all integrated patches during that time window were directly harmful or integrated by maintainers who completely lack expertise. Since the patches were found on public mailing lists before integration, it is safe to assume that the majority of these patches were exposed to discussion and reviewing. What this means is that this research work relates to the quality of the release / CM process, not necessarily to the quality of the code itself (design, development, testing). 80% compliance for a voluntary community is quite amazing. I wonder what comparable rates would be for commercial software development entities with mandatory processes - based on intuition only (no evidences yet) from my long-term experience, I would
not guess the compliance rate to be as high as 80%. But then again, an interesting point for comparison.
In practice, this means we only see here the opening shot. More evidences to be collected and analyzed. But indeed, a very interesting starting point.
Thanks, Lukas, for sharing.
Regards
Elana
From: development-process@... <development-process@...> on behalf of Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...>
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 12:14 PM To: devel@... <devel@...>; development-process@... <development-process@...> Cc: Pia Eichinger <pia.eichinger@...>; Ralf Ramsauer <ralf.ramsauer@...>; Wolfgang Mauerer <wolfgang.mauerer@...>; Paul Albertella <paul.albertella@...> Subject: [ELISA Development Process WG] Maintainers Expectations vs. Maintainers Reality: An Analysis of Organisational and Maintenance Structure of the Linux Kernel Dear all,
Pia Eichinger, a student at OTH Regensburg, mentored by Ralf Ramsauer and Wolfgang Mauerer, has written her bachelor thesis on Maintainers Expectations vs. Maintainers Reality: An Analysis of Organisational and Maintenance Structure of the Linux Kernel. Simply quoting her conclusion: "We showed that around 20% of all patches were theoretically wrongly integrated when strictly analysing MAINTAINERS. The reality of integration and maintenance structure is more complicated than that, which we also explored. Furthermore, we identified 12 major subsystems of the Linux kernel. This is very helpful for an overview of the organisational structure, realistic grouping of subsystems and further Linux kernel topology discussions." I have placed a copy of her thesis in the Google Drive folder (under Technical Community/Development Process Working Group/Development-Process-Data-Mining) here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/12ta2YxgEzEfrIcmWid8kwIyVEywbUjbA/view?usp=sharing Pia, Ralf, Wolfgang, congratulations on this work and thank you very much for your investigation. Just to give a quick insight how the various strings of work are related: - The development process working group has set the goal to understand the development management and change management of the Linux kernel. Due to priorities, the group has not worked on the distributed responsibility model for different parts of the overall code base and responsibility for change management in much detail yet. I would expect that the group eventually claims that "the person that is responsible for the acceptance of a change (a patch) is determined by the information provided in the MAINTAINERS file." - Based on that hypothesis, Pia determined the evidence for this claim and truth of that statement. The evidences suggest that this is 80% true. - The remaining challenge is now to determine if the expectation of a person assessing the development process and the evidences provided meet. In other words, is "80% truth" for this claim good enough? If this 80% conformance statement based on evidence is not sufficient, an extended and refined claim, data preparation, collection, measurement and interpretation is required. Hopefully, the Evidence Working Group can eventually formulate such research questions, interpret results appropriately and refine the analysis, e.g., create scripts to have the documentation reflect the executed reality, determine the "right" rules for interpretation and document those, and explain how to come to actual risk assessments. Some personal notes: That 20% are not integrated according to the description in MAINTAINERS might be surprising to outsiders and especially to assessors that believe that the working model is fully described and documented in a 100% structured and reality-reflected manner. The challenge is really to understand if these 20% are A. due to other implicit rules that have not been stated explicitly and outdated data on organisational structures (which implies only a low risk on the delivered product) or B. due to chaotic integration schemes, i.e., for 20% changes anyone can add anything (which implies a higher risk on the delivered product). If it is due to A, the Evidence Working Group can make those implicit rules more explicit and update the data on organisation, and hence new measurements will lead to lowering the criticality and risk of the unknown on the challenge above. If it is due to B, the change management induces a risk with a specific known upper bound for specific areas, which needs to be considered by the risk management of the downstream integrator. In the worst case, ending with the decision that the responsibility of the observed code integration is too chaotic to meet the business needs of the downstream integrator. (In other words, not everything in the kernel repository is gold; and if you rely on crappy code in the repository, you will ship crap or if you are well informed, decide not to ship crap...) So... I guess the Evidence Working Group has created yet another work result, even without kicking off... :) Paul, I certainly appreciate if you would like to continue the investigation of these evidence together with me (and maybe, Ralf and Wolfgang) and future prospective bachelor and master students. Lukas
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Maintainers Expectations vs. Maintainers Reality: An Analysis of Organisational and Maintenance Structure of the Linux Kernel
Dear all,
Pia Eichinger, a student at OTH Regensburg, mentored by Ralf Ramsauer and Wolfgang Mauerer, has written her bachelor thesis on Maintainers Expectations vs. Maintainers Reality: An Analysis of Organisational and Maintenance Structure of the Linux Kernel. Simply quoting her conclusion: "We showed that around 20% of all patches were theoretically wrongly integrated when strictly analysing MAINTAINERS. The reality of integration and maintenance structure is more complicated than that, which we also explored. Furthermore, we identified 12 major subsystems of the Linux kernel. This is very helpful for an overview of the organisational structure, realistic grouping of subsystems and further Linux kernel topology discussions." I have placed a copy of her thesis in the Google Drive folder (under Technical Community/Development Process Working Group/Development-Process-Data-Mining) here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/12ta2YxgEzEfrIcmWid8kwIyVEywbUjbA/view?usp=sharing Pia, Ralf, Wolfgang, congratulations on this work and thank you very much for your investigation. Just to give a quick insight how the various strings of work are related: - The development process working group has set the goal to understand the development management and change management of the Linux kernel. Due to priorities, the group has not worked on the distributed responsibility model for different parts of the overall code base and responsibility for change management in much detail yet. I would expect that the group eventually claims that "the person that is responsible for the acceptance of a change (a patch) is determined by the information provided in the MAINTAINERS file." - Based on that hypothesis, Pia determined the evidence for this claim and truth of that statement. The evidences suggest that this is 80% true. - The remaining challenge is now to determine if the expectation of a person assessing the development process and the evidences provided meet. In other words, is "80% truth" for this claim good enough? If this 80% conformance statement based on evidence is not sufficient, an extended and refined claim, data preparation, collection, measurement and interpretation is required. Hopefully, the Evidence Working Group can eventually formulate such research questions, interpret results appropriately and refine the analysis, e.g., create scripts to have the documentation reflect the executed reality, determine the "right" rules for interpretation and document those, and explain how to come to actual risk assessments. Some personal notes: That 20% are not integrated according to the description in MAINTAINERS might be surprising to outsiders and especially to assessors that believe that the working model is fully described and documented in a 100% structured and reality-reflected manner. The challenge is really to understand if these 20% are A. due to other implicit rules that have not been stated explicitly and outdated data on organisational structures (which implies only a low risk on the delivered product) or B. due to chaotic integration schemes, i.e., for 20% changes anyone can add anything (which implies a higher risk on the delivered product). If it is due to A, the Evidence Working Group can make those implicit rules more explicit and update the data on organisation, and hence new measurements will lead to lowering the criticality and risk of the unknown on the challenge above. If it is due to B, the change management induces a risk with a specific known upper bound for specific areas, which needs to be considered by the risk management of the downstream integrator. In the worst case, ending with the decision that the responsibility of the observed code integration is too chaotic to meet the business needs of the downstream integrator. (In other words, not everything in the kernel repository is gold; and if you rely on crappy code in the repository, you will ship crap or if you are well informed, decide not to ship crap...) So... I guess the Evidence Working Group has created yet another work result, even without kicking off... :) Paul, I certainly appreciate if you would like to continue the investigation of these evidence together with me (and maybe, Ralf and Wolfgang) and future prospective bachelor and master students. Lukas
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Re: ELISA Workshop #6 Proposal - Kernel configurations for safety critical applications
elana.copperman@...
- Topic idea: To introduce our taxonomy for kernel configurations for safety, and to agree on a set of criteiria for existing and/or new configurations which can support qualification of a Linux kernel image for use in
safety critical applications
- What you hope to accomplish in the session: To bring together Linux users who are familiar with existing kernel configurations and features for an in-depth discussion
on specific features and options. Some examples:
- Any critical participants needed for the discussion - Shauah, Elana
- Estimated time needed the sessions: short (30 min), medium(60), long(90), extra-long(120 or more) - Extra long (workshop), 2 hours
We should decide if the content is mature enough to add a link (open to all for viewing only) to the current spreadsheet draft.
Elana
From: devel@... <devel@...> on behalf of Shuah Khan <skhan@...>
Sent: Friday, November 20, 2020 1:18 AM To: devel@... <devel@...> Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@...> Subject: [ELISA Technical Community] ELISA Workshop #6 Call for Topics and Sessions All,
Yes it is time to prepare for ELISA Workshop #6 towards the end of January or early February. With a just a few weeks left this year, I am getting started early with this call for topics. Possible dates for the conference: (without conflicting LCA & FOSDEM) Jan 26-28th or Feb 2-4 2021 - a doodle poll will be sent out soon to make a final call. If you have an area of interest you want to see discussed in the ELISA Workshop #6, please send to this email list, with the subject "Workshop #6 Proposal - <your topic idea>". In the body of the email, please include: - Topic idea - What you hope to accomplish in the session - Any critical participants needed for the discussion - Estimated time needed the sessions: short (30 min), medium(60), long(90), extra-long(120 or more) Sessions can include Presentations, Technical Discussion Groups, Planning Discussions, Tutorials or Dedicated Working Sessions. Working Sessions are intended to only work on shared piece of work, a session to write together on a document or some piece of code, try out some tool together etc. (but no presentation). thanks, -- Shuah
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Re: ELISA Workshop #6 Proposal - Kernel testing reference process and follow ups for ELISA
elana.copperman@...
- Topic idea: Wrap up
report by Development Process WG for analysis of kernel test process, focusing on identifying and prioritizing follow up tasks which may be focused by ELISA
- What you hope to accomplish
in the session: WG members are engaged in a safety analysis of the Linux kernel test process, based on safety standards and a defined reference process. In this workshop, we will introduce newcomers to the ongoing safety assessment process, and attempt to
converge on initial outcomes and next steps. Newcomers and new ideas are welcome.
- Any critical participants needed for the discussion - Kate, Paul, Pete, Elana - Estimated time needed the sessions: short (30 min), medium(60), long(90), extra-long(120 or more) - Extra long (workshop), 2 hours or more, as time permits.
We should decide if the content is mature enough to add a link (open to all for viewing only) to the current spreadsheet draft.
Elana
From: devel@... <devel@...> on behalf of Shuah Khan <skhan@...>
Sent: Friday, November 20, 2020 1:18 AM To: devel@... <devel@...> Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@...> Subject: [ELISA Technical Community] ELISA Workshop #6 Call for Topics and Sessions All,
Yes it is time to prepare for ELISA Workshop #6 towards the end of January or early February. With a just a few weeks left this year, I am getting started early with this call for topics. Possible dates for the conference: (without conflicting LCA & FOSDEM) Jan 26-28th or Feb 2-4 2021 - a doodle poll will be sent out soon to make a final call. If you have an area of interest you want to see discussed in the ELISA Workshop #6, please send to this email list, with the subject "Workshop #6 Proposal - <your topic idea>". In the body of the email, please include: - Topic idea - What you hope to accomplish in the session - Any critical participants needed for the discussion - Estimated time needed the sessions: short (30 min), medium(60), long(90), extra-long(120 or more) Sessions can include Presentations, Technical Discussion Groups, Planning Discussions, Tutorials or Dedicated Working Sessions. Working Sessions are intended to only work on shared piece of work, a session to write together on a document or some piece of code, try out some tool together etc. (but no presentation). thanks, -- Shuah
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