Re: unable to host next week
Will someone host the ELISA Architecture meeting on Tuesday June 29th, 8-9am ET / 2-3pm CET? If I don't hear any volunteers by EOD Monday, I will cancel the meeting.
Thanks! -- Min Yu
Operations Manager The Linux Foundation +1(530) 902-6464 (m)
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On Thu, Jun 24, 2021 at 9:37 AM Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...> wrote:
Hi guys Due to my job transition (and other private tasks) I am not able to host next week meeting. If anybody wants to do so please let me know. Thanks Gab --------------------------------------------------------------------- INTEL CORPORATION ITALIA S.p.A. con unico socio Sede: Milanofiori Palazzo E 4 CAP 20094 Assago (MI) Capitale Sociale Euro 104.000,00 interamente versato Partita I.V.A. e Codice Fiscale 04236760155 Repertorio Economico Amministrativo n. 997124 Registro delle Imprese di Milano nr. 183983/5281/33 Soggetta ad attivita' di direzione e coordinamento di INTEL CORPORATION, USA This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review or distribution by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender and delete all copies. 
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Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...>
Hi guys
Due to my job transition (and other private tasks) I am not able to host next week meeting. If anybody wants to do so please let me know.
Thanks
Gab
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[IMPORTANT] change of WG material links
Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...>
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Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...>
Hi all
For today I have the following topic:
- Modifying CallTree to resolve Macros (StefanoD)
- Cotinuation of the re-evaluation of the FS and watchdog subsystem FMEAs in the context of the Telltale use case
Thanks
Gab
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Event: ELISA Safety-Architecture Weekly Meeting - 06/22/2021
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Reminder: ELISA Safety-Architecture Weekly Meeting
When:
06/22/2021
12:00pm to 1:00pm
(UTC+00:00) UTC
Where:
https://zoom.us/j/95775114472?pwd=VDFzTjRjNW8yd3ZOQWVLS1ZpWFlEUT09
Organizer: myu@...
myu@...
View Event
Description:
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ELISA Project is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.
Join Zoom Meeting https://zoom.us/j/95775114472?pwd=VDFzTjRjNW8yd3ZOQWVLS1ZpWFlEUT09
Meeting ID: 957 7511 4472 Passcode: 289297 One tap mobile +16465588656,,95775114472#,,,,,,0#,,289297# US (New York) +13017158592,,95775114472#,,,,,,0#,,289297# US (Germantown)
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Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...>
Dear participants of the safety architecture WG
I am writing to inform you that I am leaving Intel to join a new adventure with Red Hat.
Following my transition I expect no changes in the Safety Architecture WG activities; so
I will continue to lead the WG as usual and to contribute to ELISA as usual.
Note that my last day at Intel will be Jun 25th whereas I will join Red Hat from Jul 1st.
I will let you know if I am able to join the WG session on Jun 29th.
Kind Regards
Gab
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Re: [ELISA Development Process WG] Linux architecture
Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...>
Hi Paul
Thanks ofr raising this
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-----Original Message----- From: development-process@... <development- process@...> On Behalf Of Paul Albertella Sent: Friday, June 18, 2021 11:24 AM To: development-process@...; safety- architecture@... Subject: [ELISA Development Process WG] Linux architecture
Hi,
A term that is frequently referenced in both the Development Process and Safety Architecture working groups is 'architecture'.
This occasionally leads to misunderstandings because the term 'architecture' is used to refer to a number of different things in different contexts: system architecture, component architecture, etc
John MacGregor has written a really useful document proposing a definition of what we mean by the 'Linux architecture':
https://openjohnmacgregor.github.io/ElisaPages/LinuxArchitecture.html
I think it would be useful to discuss this document, to work out whether John's proposal requires further refinement, and how it can inform our various approaches and studies. For example, does this architecture need to be extended to include other elements that are required to provide a complete embedded OS based on the Linux kernel?
Would one of the working groups like to 'host' this in a regular session, or should we schedule a separate Zoom call? Yes I think we need to go over this document and more specifically we need to follow up on this email thread https://lists.elisa.tech/g/safety-architecture/topic/elisa_technical_community/82583176?p=,,,20,0,0,0::recentpostdate%2Fsticky,,,20,2,0,82583176 to come to a common understanding. Maybe the development process wg is a better forum to discuss this but I don't mind to host this in the arch wg eventually. @Elana what is your view on this? Thanks Gab Regards,
Paul
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Paul Albertella
Hi, A term that is frequently referenced in both the Development Process and Safety Architecture working groups is 'architecture'. This occasionally leads to misunderstandings because the term 'architecture' is used to refer to a number of different things in different contexts: system architecture, component architecture, etc John MacGregor has written a really useful document proposing a definition of what we mean by the 'Linux architecture': https://openjohnmacgregor.github.io/ElisaPages/LinuxArchitecture.htmlI think it would be useful to discuss this document, to work out whether John's proposal requires further refinement, and how it can inform our various approaches and studies. For example, does this architecture need to be extended to include other elements that are required to provide a complete embedded OS based on the Linux kernel? Would one of the working groups like to 'host' this in a regular session, or should we schedule a separate Zoom call? Regards, Paul
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Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...>
Hi All
For today I’d continue with the in-context safety measures to control the failure modes deriving from the Telltale Kernel Safety Analysis
Thanks
Gab
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Event: ELISA Safety-Architecture Weekly Meeting - 06/15/2021
#cal-reminder
safety-architecture@lists.elisa.tech Calendar <noreply@...>
Reminder: ELISA Safety-Architecture Weekly Meeting
When:
06/15/2021
12:00pm to 1:00pm
(UTC+00:00) UTC
Where:
https://zoom.us/j/95775114472?pwd=VDFzTjRjNW8yd3ZOQWVLS1ZpWFlEUT09
Organizer: myu@...
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View Event
Description:
──────────
ELISA Project is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.
Join Zoom Meeting https://zoom.us/j/95775114472?pwd=VDFzTjRjNW8yd3ZOQWVLS1ZpWFlEUT09
Meeting ID: 957 7511 4472 Passcode: 289297 One tap mobile +16465588656,,95775114472#,,,,,,0#,,289297# US (New York) +13017158592,,95775114472#,,,,,,0#,,289297# US (Germantown)
Dial by your location +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 669 900 6833 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) 855 880 1246 US Toll-free 877 369 0926 US Toll-free +1 587 328 1099 Canada +1 647 374 4685 Canada +1 647 558 0588 Canada +1 778 907 2071 Canada +1 204 272 7920 Canada +1 438 809 7799 Canada 855 703 8985 Canada Toll-free Meeting ID: 957 7511 4472 Passcode: 289297 Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/aQIrrAQlD
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Event: ELISA Safety-Architecture Weekly Meeting - 06/08/2021
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Reminder: ELISA Safety-Architecture Weekly Meeting
When:
06/08/2021
12:00pm to 1:00pm
(UTC+00:00) UTC
Where:
https://zoom.us/j/95775114472?pwd=VDFzTjRjNW8yd3ZOQWVLS1ZpWFlEUT09
Organizer: myu@...
myu@...
View Event
Description:
──────────
ELISA Project is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.
Join Zoom Meeting https://zoom.us/j/95775114472?pwd=VDFzTjRjNW8yd3ZOQWVLS1ZpWFlEUT09
Meeting ID: 957 7511 4472 Passcode: 289297 One tap mobile +16465588656,,95775114472#,,,,,,0#,,289297# US (New York) +13017158592,,95775114472#,,,,,,0#,,289297# US (Germantown)
Dial by your location +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 669 900 6833 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) 855 880 1246 US Toll-free 877 369 0926 US Toll-free +1 587 328 1099 Canada +1 647 374 4685 Canada +1 647 558 0588 Canada +1 778 907 2071 Canada +1 204 272 7920 Canada +1 438 809 7799 Canada 855 703 8985 Canada Toll-free Meeting ID: 957 7511 4472 Passcode: 289297 Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/aQIrrAQlD
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Re: [ELISA Technical Community] [ELISA Safety Architecture WG] What’s in a name?
Hi Gab, all in all, this thread is getting long and complicated. There's a lot of good thoughts here and it's hard to pick them out. As much as I hate to say it, it's probably about time to wrap this up and continue based on some document where we can have an overview. Comments below. Cheers John On 04/06/2021 11:40, Paoloni, Gabriele wrote: Hi John Sorry to come back late on this...for some reason I missed it
-----Original Message----- From: John MacGregor <open.john.macgregor@...> Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 1:09 PM To: Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...>; Christopher Temple <Christopher.Temple@...>; Gurvitz, Eli (Mobileye) <eli.gurvitz@...>; Peter.Brink@...; Paul Albertella <paul.albertella@...>; devel@...; safety- architecture@... Subject: Re: [ELISA Technical Community] [ELISA Safety Architecture WG] What’s in a name?
Hi Gab,
I dunno. I just published my definition of Linux' architecture. It's a long way from what's being looked at in the hybrid mode. Even looking at the ioctl stuff, for me libc (as part of the system environment) and the system call interface are missing.
For me, "software architectural design" is a bit of an oxymoron, like "bureaucratic efficiency" or "military intelligence". There's architecture and then there's design. But, that's probably just my problem.
In an e-mail subsequent to this[1] (and the subsequent correction [2]), I established that 26262 doesn't really address where software architecture is defined.
I have to admit, much to my chagrin, that I've been looking at the 2011 version of 26262 rather than the 2018 version, out of habit actually. In some points, ISO has been clearer in the later version.
Note that that software architecture (in Part 6) is the software architecture of the _system_, i.e. the item, not necessarily the software architecture of an element (except, perhaps, an SEooC), or a component. I'd say that Linux is a component, although some might want to view it as an element. In my view the question is "would you consider Linux as a SW Unit (as defined in ISO26262-1-3.159) ? " If we look at the term 3.159 above we read: <<3.159 software unit atomic level software component (3.157) of the software architecture (3.1) that can be subjected to stand-alone testing (3.169)>> In my personal opinion Linux cannot be,usually, seen as an atomic level SW component, given its complexity and the amount of nominal and safety requirements allocated to it. Instead I think that there are multiple levels of SW Archictural design (part6.7) (starting from a high level system view) where also Linux needs to be decomposed.
Agree, although, as I said below, at the highest level of System SW Architectural Design, I'd say that the operating system functionality should be expressed in terms of the resources (processes, memory, files, etc.) it manages, as I defined for the Linux architecture: https://openjohnmacgregor.github.io/ElisaPages/LinuxArchitecture.htmlBTW, I ran across this Linux "Map" recently, although I have the vague feeling I've seen it a number of times before. I wouldn't call it an architectural design, but I don't know what I'd call it. At any rate, it gives a "big picture" (or at least an idea of one) of what might be involved in decomposing Linux into separately testable units. At least it might be worth a glance in the WG meeting (p.s. you can also click on the "svg" or "pdf" links). https://makelinux.github.io/kernel/map/It's funny how things that go round come round. In the Pseudo-DIA discussion I made the point that the role in the development process played by an off-the-shelf component, and the corresponding development steps, are different from the role of software being developed for use in the system (see the diagramme). The standards only directly address the latter type. https://openjohnmacgregor.github.io/ElisaPages/PseudoDIA.html#veil-2-were-talking-about-an-operating-system-here The point here is that there are probably a number of slightly different views on the architecture, design etc. of a software component, the system software and maybe even the system as a whole: - first of all, there is the view during construction, where the upper levels of the elements to be developed are kept abstract and the lower levels consider more semantic and deployment constraints. - second, there is the verification view where the upper levels focus on integration aspects. Note that, in the case of an OTS component, some integration testing occurs during the development phase rather than the verification phase. - third, for components, there is the selection view where the emphasis is on identifying variability in an existing component and refining the view of whether a variant is (still) acceptable as the vision of the system becomes more complete. Also, the component exists already. What's there exists in very explicit detail and must be abstracted rather than being refined. For example, in the Linux map above, the interfaces are expressed in terms of implemented functions. What benefit is there in abstracting them? This sounds quite academic at the moment, but it might be relevant when we broaden the scope of the hybrid approach. In the latest hybrid qualification approach presentation[3], you've discussed the unit design level of the process. Note that according to 7.4.4, the software architectural design stops where the units are merely identified. 8.4.4, on the other hand, says that the unit design should specify the units' functional behaviour and design down to the level necessary for their implementation.
I'd say that, considering that in the item's context, an operating system function (superficially) is to allow access to and to manage hardware and software resources , the operating system is a unit and it's a unit at the system software architecture level. From my previous experience usually a SW unit is identified as a single function (in C)
I'd also say that 8.4.4 also comprises all of the operating system's architecture, design and implementation considerations. That being said, there's probably no good reason not to apply the software architecture design requirements (7.*) to a unit's architecture. From this statement it seems to me that we are aligned from a "common sense" point of view; i.e. Linux is complex and must be decomposed, hence 7.* applies.
The disambiguation would therefore be "software unit design".
What do you think? Personally I don’t like it as, as said above, I am used to think of a SW unit as a single function and plus in the hybrid approach a SW Unit would be exactly a component qualified following part8.12 (plus additional design measures as needed and to be discussed); however let's discuss it, I am open to revisit the terminology if other people think that "SW Unit Design" is the right terminology to describe what I have called "SW Architectural Design" previously....
The DIA diagramme that I cited was derived from IEC 61508. In 61508, there's module design and unit testing... and software system design and no software architectural design. And there are other standards... I can see that for the hybrid approach, decomposing the OS is advantageous. For the approach Paul Albertella is proposing, it's not so clear. What got me, and probably Paul, started on this thread, is the ambiguity caused by the standards specifying the steps in the development process and naming their work products, but not saying exactly what constitutes the work product. I've defined the Linux Architecture and I don't think that's what anybody in the Architecture WG would have expected. That being said, I did it independently and was surprised to find similar definitions from other sources after the fact. Like you said, we probably agree on practical terms. I think that the whole project should have the same vision of both the activities and the work products involved in the various phases of the development process. I might think that this is a subject best addressed by the Ontology... Subgroup? Task Force?, but progress seems a little slow. Thanks Gab
To an extent, that resolves the abstraction / granularity conundrum.
But... [4] uses the classification: requirements viewpoint, functional viewpoint, logical viewpoint and technical viewpoint, which I find to be intuitive. As I said in [2], I'd have equated them with different phases in the development process. This doesn't seem to be the case in 26262.
I think that my next exercise will be to find some synthesis between part 3 and part 6 as well as the viewpoints I've outlined above. I think it should include an example based on the telltale use case. Again, it should also avoid 26262 terminology.
Cheers
John
[1] https://lists.elisa.tech/g/safety-architecture/message/499 [2] https://lists.elisa.tech/g/safety-architecture/message/502 [3] https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1BoK0PC1yYWuVtT4AuK_VW1T2U2 WwQZTF [4] https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-642-34614-9
On 05/05/2021 11:32, Paoloni, Gabriele wrote:
Hi guys
WRT the discussions that we are having right now about the hybrid mode I think that the best nomenclature would be "SW Architecture" or "SW Architecture Design" and to disambiguate we could clearly refer to: ISO26262-6.7 - " Software architectural design".
What do you think?
Thanks Gab
-----Original Message----- From: safety-architecture@... <safety- architecture@...> On Behalf Of John MacGregor Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 10:30 AM To: Christopher Temple <Christopher.Temple@...>; Gurvitz, Eli (Mobileye) <eli.gurvitz@...>; Peter.Brink@...; Paul Albertella <paul.albertella@...>; devel@...; safety- architecture@... Subject: Re: [ELISA Technical Community] [ELISA Safety Architecture WG] What’s in a name?
Hi Chris
The referenced definition is great - in-depth, with a discussion of the different perceptions of the term "architecture" and then again not too long. It addresses my concern that the definition must be more than just nomenclature.
Note the link at the top of the page to the conceptual model. While it's more or less what I would have expected, I liked the emphasis on the facts that the model is abstract and that it should focus on documenting the concerns and decisions driving the architecture.
I hope we can find more such good descriptions for other problematic terms in the realm of safety and embedded systems.
Cheers
John
On 04/05/2021 23:11, Christopher Temple wrote:
It could be a long discussion.
Couldn't we work with ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 http://www.iso- architecture.org/ieee-1471/defining-architecture.html ?
It's quite close to the understandings shared below.
Best regards Chris
-----Original Message----- From: devel@... <devel@...> On Behalf Of
Gurvitz,
Eli (Mobileye) via lists.elisa.tech
Sent: Dienstag, 4. Mai 2021 23:01 To: Peter.Brink@...; open.john.macgregor@...; Paul Albertella
<paul.albertella@...>; devel@...; safety- architecture@...
Subject: Re: [ELISA Technical Community] [ELISA Safety Architecture WG]
What’s in a name?
And I'd like to add that the first 3 types of "architecture"s that Paul lists below are one and the same, phrased in different forms of technical English.
So I'd like to suggest that we think of "architecture" as a set of components,
their properties and the interfaces between them. Together they comprise a
"system" whose purpose is to implement some specific requirements.
Thanks, Eli
-----Original Message----- From: devel@... <devel@...> On Behalf Of Brink, Peter via lists.elisa.tech
Sent: Tuesday, May 04, 2021 20:16 To: open.john.macgregor@...; Paul Albertella <paul.albertella@...>; devel@...; safety- architecture@...
Subject: Re: [ELISA Technical Community] [ELISA Safety Architecture WG]
What’s in a name?
Which is kind of the point of an architecture 😊
-----Original Message----- From: devel@... <devel@...> On Behalf Of John MacGregor via lists.elisa.tech
Sent: Tuesday, May 4, 2021 10:14 AM To: Brink, Peter <Peter.Brink@...>; Paul Albertella <paul.albertella@...>; devel@...; safety- architecture@...
Subject: Re: [ELISA Technical Community] [ELISA Safety Architecture WG]
What’s in a name?
Mea Culpa,
I've always been guilty of seeing the forest and forgetting a couple of trees...
On 04/05/2021 19:12, Brink, Peter wrote:
Not a botanist indeed, John. You left off the calyx and the corolla in
your
flower description.
-----Original Message----- From: devel@... <devel@...> On Behalf Of John MacGregor via lists.elisa.tech Sent: Tuesday, May 4, 2021 9:54 AM To: Paul Albertella <paul.albertella@...>; devel@...; safety-architecture@... Subject: Re: [ELISA Technical Community] [ELISA Safety Architecture
WG]
What’s in a name?
Hi Paul
Great start. I'd have started with Shakespeare too!
The point for me, as I said in the last Sync Telco, was the issue is not just
the nomenclature. It's understanding what comprises each of the concepts
and what role in the development process they serve. An architecture differs from a design which differs from an implementation at least in the level of abstraction and granularity.
I'll probably have to expand on the idea in the future (and I don't have
time now). But for now, I'll give a small example:
The architecture of a rose is probably aligned with the attributes that
make it recognisable:
- a stem with thorns, branches and leaves - a flower with a certain distinctive petal form - a distinctive smell that may or may not repel enemies
The design of a rose could - refine the shape and effects of the thorns, branches, leaves, petals, to support structural stability, environmental robustness, etc. - address nourishment and reproduction issues, adding roots, pistils and stamen
The implementation of a rose might detail the different breeds of roses.... Hey, even botanists get it :-) [1]
I'm not a botanist, and off the top of my head, I'm not sure whether
the
non-functional aspects (nourishment and reproduction) aren't architectural
concerns, but I'm using the example as a light-hearted example of the differences in abstraction and granularity.
Cheers
John
BTW, the _Name_ of the Rose is a vaastly different kettle of fish.
[1]
https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fjour
nals.ashs.org%2Fhortsci%2Fview%2Fjournals%2Fhortsci%2F54%2F2%2Farticl
e
-
p236.xml&data=04%7C01%7CPeter.Brink%40ul.com%7C1343db7da51b4
93608
0208d90f201ff9%7C701159540ccd45f087bd03b2a3587569%7C0%7C0%7C63755
74529
14338884%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoi
V2luMzIiL
CJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=twe4Zl9o6LJSxw5r
MdDA3wv
ionay%2BhN%2Fs7zGnrSK0dc%3D&reserved=0
On 04/05/2021 18:19, Paul Albertella wrote:
Hi,
What’s in a name? that which we call a rose By any other name would smell as sweet --- W Shakespeare "Romeo and Juliet"
As John MacGregor commented on today's Safety Architecture call,
our
discussions are occasionally marred by misunderstandings arising from the use of terminology that *seems* to be unambiguous, but actually means different things to different people, or in different contexts.
I believe that we can help to address this by compiling a common 'lexicon' of terms and definitions that we can use in ELISA discussions and publications, relating these to specific domains or contexts where necessary.
The term 'architecture', which John picked on today, for example, has at least four distinct meanings in the context of ELISA. Here are are some definitions that may be helpful:
1) Software architecture
The Software Engineering Body of Knowledge [1] includes
architecture
under the general heading of design, noting that "Architectural design describes how software is organized into components", while "Detailed design describes the desired behavior of these
components."
It adds that a software architecture can be strictly defined as "the set of structures needed to reason about the system, which comprise software elements, relations among them, and properties of both”,
but
notes that it can be further subdivided into 'views' (physical, logical, process, development), focusing on different aspects of the system (distribution, functionality, concurrency, implementation).
2) System architecture
This has a very similar meaning to the term in the software context, but extends the scope to include the hardware components of a
system.
IEC 61508 defines architecture as a "specific configuration of hardware and software elements in a system". ISO 26262 [3] applies the term to both hardware/software combinations and pure software elements, defining it as a "representation of the structure of the item or element that allows identification of building blocks, their boundaries and interfaces, and includes the allocation of requirements to these building blocks".
3) Safety architecture
This is more or less the same as a system architecture, but focussing only on safety.
ISO 26262 [3] defines it as the "set of elements and their interaction to fulfil the safety requirements", where an element may be a system, component (hardware or software), hardware part, or
software unit.
4) CPU architecture
The term 'architecture' in discussions about the Linux kernel frequently has a different meaning again, referring to the underlying architecture of the processor (x86, ARM, MIPs, etc) in a target system, and the associated 'architecture-specific' components of the
kernel.
Regards,
Paul
[1]
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w
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s98f4p7i
nt%2Fr5DqGlDlkTWAQ%3D&reserved=0 [2]
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hive.org%2Fdetails%2Fgov.in.is.iec.61508.4.1998&data=04%7C01%7CPe
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3D&
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Re: [ELISA Technical Community] [ELISA Safety Architecture WG] What’s in a name?
Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...>
Hi John
Sorry to come back late on this...for some reason I missed it
toggle quoted messageShow quoted text
-----Original Message----- From: John MacGregor <open.john.macgregor@...> Sent: Tuesday, May 25, 2021 1:09 PM To: Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...>; Christopher Temple <Christopher.Temple@...>; Gurvitz, Eli (Mobileye) <eli.gurvitz@...>; Peter.Brink@...; Paul Albertella <paul.albertella@...>; devel@...; safety- architecture@... Subject: Re: [ELISA Technical Community] [ELISA Safety Architecture WG] What’s in a name?
Hi Gab,
I dunno. I just published my definition of Linux' architecture. It's a long way from what's being looked at in the hybrid mode. Even looking at the ioctl stuff, for me libc (as part of the system environment) and the system call interface are missing.
For me, "software architectural design" is a bit of an oxymoron, like "bureaucratic efficiency" or "military intelligence". There's architecture and then there's design. But, that's probably just my problem.
In an e-mail subsequent to this[1] (and the subsequent correction [2]), I established that 26262 doesn't really address where software architecture is defined.
I have to admit, much to my chagrin, that I've been looking at the 2011 version of 26262 rather than the 2018 version, out of habit actually. In some points, ISO has been clearer in the later version.
Note that that software architecture (in Part 6) is the software architecture of the _system_, i.e. the item, not necessarily the software architecture of an element (except, perhaps, an SEooC), or a component. I'd say that Linux is a component, although some might want to view it as an element. In my view the question is "would you consider Linux as a SW Unit (as defined in ISO26262-1-3.159) ? " If we look at the term 3.159 above we read: <<3.159 software unit atomic level software component (3.157) of the software architecture (3.1) that can be subjected to stand-alone testing (3.169)>> In my personal opinion Linux cannot be,usually, seen as an atomic level SW component, given its complexity and the amount of nominal and safety requirements allocated to it. Instead I think that there are multiple levels of SW Archictural design (part6.7) (starting from a high level system view) where also Linux needs to be decomposed. In the latest hybrid qualification approach presentation[3], you've discussed the unit design level of the process. Note that according to 7.4.4, the software architectural design stops where the units are merely identified. 8.4.4, on the other hand, says that the unit design should specify the units' functional behaviour and design down to the level necessary for their implementation.
I'd say that, considering that in the item's context, an operating system function (superficially) is to allow access to and to manage hardware and software resources , the operating system is a unit and it's a unit at the system software architecture level.
From my previous experience usually a SW unit is identified as a single function (in C) I'd also say that 8.4.4 also comprises all of the operating system's architecture, design and implementation considerations. That being said, there's probably no good reason not to apply the software architecture design requirements (7.*) to a unit's architecture.
From this statement it seems to me that we are aligned from a "common sense" point of view; i.e. Linux is complex and must be decomposed, hence 7.* applies. The disambiguation would therefore be "software unit design".
What do you think?
Personally I don’t like it as, as said above, I am used to think of a SW unit as a single function and plus in the hybrid approach a SW Unit would be exactly a component qualified following part8.12 (plus additional design measures as needed and to be discussed); however let's discuss it, I am open to revisit the terminology if other people think that "SW Unit Design" is the right terminology to describe what I have called "SW Architectural Design" previously.... Thanks Gab To an extent, that resolves the abstraction / granularity conundrum.
But... [4] uses the classification: requirements viewpoint, functional viewpoint, logical viewpoint and technical viewpoint, which I find to be intuitive. As I said in [2], I'd have equated them with different phases in the development process. This doesn't seem to be the case in 26262.
I think that my next exercise will be to find some synthesis between part 3 and part 6 as well as the viewpoints I've outlined above. I think it should include an example based on the telltale use case. Again, it should also avoid 26262 terminology.
Cheers
John
[1] https://lists.elisa.tech/g/safety-architecture/message/499 [2] https://lists.elisa.tech/g/safety-architecture/message/502 [3] https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1BoK0PC1yYWuVtT4AuK_VW1T2U2 WwQZTF [4] https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-642-34614-9
On 05/05/2021 11:32, Paoloni, Gabriele wrote:
Hi guys
WRT the discussions that we are having right now about the hybrid mode I think that the best nomenclature would be "SW Architecture" or "SW Architecture Design" and to disambiguate we could clearly refer to: ISO26262-6.7 - " Software architectural design".
What do you think?
Thanks Gab
-----Original Message----- From: safety-architecture@... <safety- architecture@...> On Behalf Of John MacGregor Sent: Wednesday, May 5, 2021 10:30 AM To: Christopher Temple <Christopher.Temple@...>; Gurvitz, Eli (Mobileye) <eli.gurvitz@...>; Peter.Brink@...; Paul Albertella <paul.albertella@...>; devel@...; safety- architecture@... Subject: Re: [ELISA Technical Community] [ELISA Safety Architecture WG] What’s in a name?
Hi Chris
The referenced definition is great - in-depth, with a discussion of the different perceptions of the term "architecture" and then again not too long. It addresses my concern that the definition must be more than just nomenclature.
Note the link at the top of the page to the conceptual model. While it's more or less what I would have expected, I liked the emphasis on the facts that the model is abstract and that it should focus on documenting the concerns and decisions driving the architecture.
I hope we can find more such good descriptions for other problematic terms in the realm of safety and embedded systems.
Cheers
John
On 04/05/2021 23:11, Christopher Temple wrote:
It could be a long discussion.
Couldn't we work with ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 http://www.iso- architecture.org/ieee-1471/defining-architecture.html ?
It's quite close to the understandings shared below.
Best regards Chris
-----Original Message----- From: devel@... <devel@...> On Behalf Of
Gurvitz,
Eli (Mobileye) via lists.elisa.tech
Sent: Dienstag, 4. Mai 2021 23:01 To: Peter.Brink@...; open.john.macgregor@...; Paul Albertella
<paul.albertella@...>; devel@...; safety- architecture@...
Subject: Re: [ELISA Technical Community] [ELISA Safety Architecture WG]
What’s in a name?
And I'd like to add that the first 3 types of "architecture"s that Paul lists below are one and the same, phrased in different forms of technical English.
So I'd like to suggest that we think of "architecture" as a set of components,
their properties and the interfaces between them. Together they comprise a
"system" whose purpose is to implement some specific requirements.
Thanks, Eli
-----Original Message----- From: devel@... <devel@...> On Behalf Of Brink, Peter via lists.elisa.tech
Sent: Tuesday, May 04, 2021 20:16 To: open.john.macgregor@...; Paul Albertella <paul.albertella@...>; devel@...; safety- architecture@...
Subject: Re: [ELISA Technical Community] [ELISA Safety Architecture WG]
What’s in a name?
Which is kind of the point of an architecture 😊
-----Original Message----- From: devel@... <devel@...> On Behalf Of John MacGregor via lists.elisa.tech
Sent: Tuesday, May 4, 2021 10:14 AM To: Brink, Peter <Peter.Brink@...>; Paul Albertella <paul.albertella@...>; devel@...; safety- architecture@...
Subject: Re: [ELISA Technical Community] [ELISA Safety Architecture WG]
What’s in a name?
Mea Culpa,
I've always been guilty of seeing the forest and forgetting a couple of trees...
On 04/05/2021 19:12, Brink, Peter wrote:
Not a botanist indeed, John. You left off the calyx and the corolla in
your
flower description.
-----Original Message----- From: devel@... <devel@...> On Behalf Of John MacGregor via lists.elisa.tech Sent: Tuesday, May 4, 2021 9:54 AM To: Paul Albertella <paul.albertella@...>; devel@...; safety-architecture@... Subject: Re: [ELISA Technical Community] [ELISA Safety Architecture
WG]
What’s in a name?
Hi Paul
Great start. I'd have started with Shakespeare too!
The point for me, as I said in the last Sync Telco, was the issue is not just
the nomenclature. It's understanding what comprises each of the concepts
and what role in the development process they serve. An architecture differs from a design which differs from an implementation at least in the level of abstraction and granularity.
I'll probably have to expand on the idea in the future (and I don't have
time now). But for now, I'll give a small example:
The architecture of a rose is probably aligned with the attributes that
make it recognisable:
- a stem with thorns, branches and leaves - a flower with a certain distinctive petal form - a distinctive smell that may or may not repel enemies
The design of a rose could - refine the shape and effects of the thorns, branches, leaves, petals, to support structural stability, environmental robustness, etc. - address nourishment and reproduction issues, adding roots, pistils and stamen
The implementation of a rose might detail the different breeds of roses.... Hey, even botanists get it :-) [1]
I'm not a botanist, and off the top of my head, I'm not sure whether
the
non-functional aspects (nourishment and reproduction) aren't architectural
concerns, but I'm using the example as a light-hearted example of the differences in abstraction and granularity.
Cheers
John
BTW, the _Name_ of the Rose is a vaastly different kettle of fish.
[1]
https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fjour
nals.ashs.org%2Fhortsci%2Fview%2Fjournals%2Fhortsci%2F54%2F2%2Farticl
e
-
p236.xml&data=04%7C01%7CPeter.Brink%40ul.com%7C1343db7da51b4
93608
0208d90f201ff9%7C701159540ccd45f087bd03b2a3587569%7C0%7C0%7C63755
74529
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V2luMzIiL
CJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=twe4Zl9o6LJSxw5r
MdDA3wv
ionay%2BhN%2Fs7zGnrSK0dc%3D&reserved=0
On 04/05/2021 18:19, Paul Albertella wrote:
Hi,
What’s in a name? that which we call a rose By any other name would smell as sweet --- W Shakespeare "Romeo and Juliet"
As John MacGregor commented on today's Safety Architecture call,
our
discussions are occasionally marred by misunderstandings arising from the use of terminology that *seems* to be unambiguous, but actually means different things to different people, or in different contexts.
I believe that we can help to address this by compiling a common 'lexicon' of terms and definitions that we can use in ELISA discussions and publications, relating these to specific domains or contexts where necessary.
The term 'architecture', which John picked on today, for example, has at least four distinct meanings in the context of ELISA. Here are are some definitions that may be helpful:
1) Software architecture
The Software Engineering Body of Knowledge [1] includes
architecture
under the general heading of design, noting that "Architectural design describes how software is organized into components", while "Detailed design describes the desired behavior of these
components."
It adds that a software architecture can be strictly defined as "the set of structures needed to reason about the system, which comprise software elements, relations among them, and properties of both”,
but
notes that it can be further subdivided into 'views' (physical, logical, process, development), focusing on different aspects of the system (distribution, functionality, concurrency, implementation).
2) System architecture
This has a very similar meaning to the term in the software context, but extends the scope to include the hardware components of a
system.
IEC 61508 defines architecture as a "specific configuration of hardware and software elements in a system". ISO 26262 [3] applies the term to both hardware/software combinations and pure software elements, defining it as a "representation of the structure of the item or element that allows identification of building blocks, their boundaries and interfaces, and includes the allocation of requirements to these building blocks".
3) Safety architecture
This is more or less the same as a system architecture, but focussing only on safety.
ISO 26262 [3] defines it as the "set of elements and their interaction to fulfil the safety requirements", where an element may be a system, component (hardware or software), hardware part, or
software unit.
4) CPU architecture
The term 'architecture' in discussions about the Linux kernel frequently has a different meaning again, referring to the underlying architecture of the processor (x86, ARM, MIPs, etc) in a target system, and the associated 'architecture-specific' components of the
kernel.
Regards,
Paul
[1]
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engineerin
g&data=04%7C01%7CPeter.Brink%40ul.com%7C1343db7da51b49360802
08d90
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zIiLCJBTi
I6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=NpmQyjx9wYhQDEzy8z5
s98f4p7i
nt%2Fr5DqGlDlkTWAQ%3D&reserved=0 [2]
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hive.org%2Fdetails%2Fgov.in.is.iec.61508.4.1998&data=04%7C01%7CPe
ter.Brink%40ul.com%7C1343db7da51b4936080208d90f201ff9%7C701159540cc
d4
5f087bd03b2a3587569%7C0%7C0%7C637557452914348879%7CUnknown%7C
TWFpbGZs
b3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn
0%3
D%7C1000&sdata=3RMrJan1IqiCJ0Wv4kgXQqTAtpThyJjNhUcZckGJ180%
3D&
;reserved=0 [3]
https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fww
w
.iso.org%2Fobp%2Fui%2F%23iso%3Astd%3Aiso%3A26262%3A-
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n&data=04%7C01%7CPeter.Brink%40ul.com%7C1343db7da51b49360802
08d90
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3488
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zIiLCJBTi
I6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=4XCPMIOfGI1ZLwmLRU
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Cancelled Event: ELISA Safety-Architecture Weekly Meeting - Tuesday, June 1, 2021
#cal-cancelled
safety-architecture@lists.elisa.tech Calendar <noreply@...>
Cancelled: ELISA Safety-Architecture Weekly Meeting
This event has been cancelled.
When:
Tuesday, June 1, 2021
12:00pm to 1:00pm
(UTC+00:00) UTC
Where:
https://zoom.us/j/95775114472?pwd=VDFzTjRjNW8yd3ZOQWVLS1ZpWFlEUT09
Organizer: myu@...
myu@...
Description:
──────────
ELISA Project is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.
Join Zoom Meeting https://zoom.us/j/95775114472?pwd=VDFzTjRjNW8yd3ZOQWVLS1ZpWFlEUT09
Meeting ID: 957 7511 4472 Passcode: 289297 One tap mobile +16465588656,,95775114472#,,,,,,0#,,289297# US (New York) +13017158592,,95775114472#,,,,,,0#,,289297# US (Germantown)
Dial by your location +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) +1 669 900 6833 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) 855 880 1246 US Toll-free 877 369 0926 US Toll-free +1 587 328 1099 Canada +1 647 374 4685 Canada +1 647 558 0588 Canada +1 778 907 2071 Canada +1 204 272 7920 Canada +1 438 809 7799 Canada 855 703 8985 Canada Toll-free Meeting ID: 957 7511 4472 Passcode: 289297 Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/aQIrrAQlD
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Re: anybody wishing to chair next week?
Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...>
Hi All
Following the email below I didn’t get any volunteer to chair, so the meeting for today is cancelled.
Regards
Gab
toggle quoted messageShow quoted text
From: Paoloni, Gabriele
Sent: Friday, May 28, 2021 2:20 PM
To: safety-architecture@...
Subject: anybody wishing to chair next week?
Hi All
I just realized that I have booked vacation for next week from Mon to Wed inclusive. So I will not be able to chair the Safety Arch WG meeting.
Please let me know if anybody want to chair, otherwise we’ll cancel the meeting.
Thanks
Gab
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Event: ELISA Safety-Architecture Weekly Meeting - 06/01/2021
#cal-reminder
safety-architecture@lists.elisa.tech Calendar <noreply@...>
Reminder: ELISA Safety-Architecture Weekly Meeting
When:
06/01/2021
12:00pm to 1:00pm
(UTC+00:00) UTC
Where:
https://zoom.us/j/95775114472?pwd=VDFzTjRjNW8yd3ZOQWVLS1ZpWFlEUT09
Organizer: myu@...
myu@...
View Event
Description:
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ELISA Project is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.
Join Zoom Meeting https://zoom.us/j/95775114472?pwd=VDFzTjRjNW8yd3ZOQWVLS1ZpWFlEUT09
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Re: The "quick and easy" approach as alternative to the hybrid approach

Lukas Bulwahn
On Fri, May 28, 2021 at 4:51 PM Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...> wrote: Hi Lukas
-----Original Message----- From: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...> Sent: Friday, May 28, 2021 4:14 PM To: Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...> Cc: safety-architecture@... Subject: Re: [ELISA Safety Architecture WG] The "quick and easy" approach as alternative to the hybrid approach
On Fri, May 28, 2021 at 3:29 PM Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...> wrote:
I would propose a very simple "quick and easy" approach to architecture to comply with "safety standard X". (X may be replaced
by
any standard that meets assumption (1) below.)
Assumptions: (1) Safety standard X demands the existence of an architecture for a safety-critical software. (2) Every software once implemented has by definition an
architecture.
Conclusion: A software once implemented fulfils the demand of the safety standard X.
Due to the discussion on the hybrid approach, I finally discovered this very quick and easy approach to claim compliance with the "architecture clause of the safety standard X". This will help me a lot. Thanks for all the support. I do not see how this 'quick and easy' approach can be related to the hybrid approach since the latter implies a safety analysis on the derived architecture.
Thanks, I think that I now understand that the safety analysis is the core; so given a reasonable understanding of the functionality and a bit of kernel expertise, the safety analysis could potentially be done without any artefacts that the hybrid approach currently foresees to "generate" as preparational step to the safety analysis. So, the From my experience a safety analysis based exclusively on expert judgement (hence without a supporting arch design doc) is hardly acceptable
Well, from my experience, the only key criteria for a safety analysis is expert knowledge and expert judgement; all criteria on formality can be met independently of the behaviour, risks and complexity of the actual system by any stringent organizational support, without affecting the content of the technical claims derived, i.e., the conclusions of the safety analysis. So, all supporting material is only to show evidence for the experts' knowledge of the system and to serve as communication means among them to show and ensure equal expert knowledge. Hence, a supporting arch design document is useless if it has not been manually created by the involved experts in alignment and with the goal to be used as evidence that the involved experts during the execution of the safety analysis have deeper knowledge about the system.
If I understand the approach right, you envision the supporting arch design document to be created pretty automatically and hence show that the expertise of the involved experts for the safety analysis is on-par to what a basic (knowingly incomplete) source code analysis can derive; I think that can serve as a good basis for the proof of competence of the involved experts. With that at hand, then you can quickly also just execute the safety analysis and you are done. This sounds like a good plan to quickly and easily achieve compliance. I propose you continue that approach with precisely that goal in mind. Nope, arch design doc is not created automatically. It is computer aided but not automatic. More specifically the communication diagrams (static views of SW units blocks communicating with each other) is automatic, however the dynamic behavior (described by the sequence diagram or automata diagram and kernel-doc headers) is based on manual creation with some computer aided design.
I like your approach of visualizing the existing call-tree structure. That is nice and we did that, too, back in 2019 and 2020 and shared that with the group; just as Constantine did that as well many years ago, and shared it with everyone back then; there was also a reason for us to develop the call graph tool, although in the various contexts, we applied it, it was clearly used for other means that claim any completeness or meaningful interpretation by itself, e.g., only to visualize other information, e.g., information in test coverage reports, we could simply not grasp otherwise in a meaningful way (and we always acknowledged the incompleteness of our call graph analysis). Once we have the design doc, this is used to evaluate the current design against the allocated safety reqs, possible failure modes, the effects and existing or possible mitigations.
Don't you need to know the specific allocated safety requirement to determine if this one kind of breakdown/decomposition you propose is meaningful at all for the specific allocated safety requirement? Hint: A safety requirement is very often not a requirement to a single isolated function, nor may it be necessarily linked to a synchronous behaviour of the system; remember the ECC example and its handling through HW and SW. E.g., define sources of interference and explain how the call graph is related to those sources of interference. As I already said, for the identification of interference patterns, and other alternative approaches, we best start new working groups (e.g., the "Identification of interference in a complex HW-SW system and its impact" WG) with a fresh start without being driven by any previous limits of conception. I think the architecture working group (and anyone that believes in the value of the approach) should continue to look at the call graphs, try to land some patches with kernel-doc comments (let us see what the maintainers' feedback is here; as far as remember, the patches from linux.intel.com with the safety-critical/safety-related keyword have been well and properly handled so far from a quality perspective), and then continue to understand where the added value of hybrid approach finally kicks in contributing to the objectives beyond achieving compliance to some interpretation of some historically scoped standards. You just got here some food for thought from me, let us keep it with that. I propose you continue your approach and we let others make the other valuable alternative approaches evolve as well. Gab, I wish you good luck :) Best regards, Lukas
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Re: The "quick and easy" approach as alternative to the hybrid approach
Gab, I completely agree. It was not easy to build Linux and re-thinking and documenting cannot be quick & easy. * Redundancy => Safety * Quick & Easy => Danger
Of course we can reduce the pain, e.g. by using document generators as we do at Validas, but that's just one part of the approach we propose
Kind regards, Oscar
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- Von: safety-architecture@... <safety-architecture@...> Im Auftrag von Paoloni, Gabriele Gesendet: Freitag, 28. Mai 2021 16:51 An: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...> Cc: safety-architecture@... Betreff: Re: [ELISA Safety Architecture WG] The "quick and easy" approach as alternative to the hybrid approach
Hi Lukas
toggle quoted messageShow quoted text
-----Original Message----- From: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...> Sent: Friday, May 28, 2021 4:14 PM To: Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...> Cc: safety-architecture@... Subject: Re: [ELISA Safety Architecture WG] The "quick and easy" approach as alternative to the hybrid approach
On Fri, May 28, 2021 at 3:29 PM Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...> wrote:
I would propose a very simple "quick and easy" approach to architecture to comply with "safety standard X". (X may be replaced
by
any standard that meets assumption (1) below.)
Assumptions: (1) Safety standard X demands the existence of an architecture for a safety-critical software. (2) Every software once implemented has by definition an
architecture.
Conclusion: A software once implemented fulfils the demand of the safety standard X.
Due to the discussion on the hybrid approach, I finally discovered this very quick and easy approach to claim compliance with the "architecture clause of the safety standard X". This will help me a lot. Thanks for all the support. I do not see how this 'quick and easy' approach can be related to the hybrid approach since the latter implies a safety analysis on the derived architecture.
Thanks, I think that I now understand that the safety analysis is the core; so given a reasonable understanding of the functionality and a bit of kernel expertise, the safety analysis could potentially be done without any artefacts that the hybrid approach currently foresees to "generate" as preparational step to the safety analysis. So, the From my experience a safety analysis based exclusively on expert judgement (hence without a supporting arch design doc) is hardly acceptable
Well, from my experience, the only key criteria for a safety analysis is expert knowledge and expert judgement; all criteria on formality can be met independently of the behaviour, risks and complexity of the actual system by any stringent organizational support, without affecting the content of the technical claims derived, i.e., the conclusions of the safety analysis. So, all supporting material is only to show evidence for the experts' knowledge of the system and to serve as communication means among them to show and ensure equal expert knowledge. Hence, a supporting arch design document is useless if it has not been manually created by the involved experts in alignment and with the goal to be used as evidence that the involved experts during the execution of the safety analysis have deeper knowledge about the system.
If I understand the approach right, you envision the supporting arch design document to be created pretty automatically and hence show that the expertise of the involved experts for the safety analysis is on-par to what a basic (knowingly incomplete) source code analysis can derive; I think that can serve as a good basis for the proof of competence of the involved experts. With that at hand, then you can quickly also just execute the safety analysis and you are done. This sounds like a good plan to quickly and easily achieve compliance. I propose you continue that approach with precisely that goal in mind. Nope, arch design doc is not created automatically. It is computer aided but not automatic. More specifically the communication diagrams (static views of SW units blocks communicating with each other) is automatic, however the dynamic behavior (described by the sequence diagram or automata diagram and kernel-doc headers) is based on manual creation with some computer aided design. Once we have the design doc, this is used to evaluate the current design against the allocated safety reqs, possible failure modes, the effects and existing or possible mitigations. Finally the design doc can be used to derive and assess a test campaign and runtime verification monitors are used to spot defects either in the code or in the model (that as I said are done manually). So I don’t think that this approach is so 'quick and easy'... Thanks Gab
Lukas
--------------------------------------------------------------------- INTEL CORPORATION ITALIA S.p.A. con unico socio Sede: Milanofiori Palazzo E 4 CAP 20094 Assago (MI) Capitale Sociale Euro 104.000,00 interamente versato Partita I.V.A. e Codice Fiscale 04236760155 Repertorio Economico Amministrativo n. 997124 Registro delle Imprese di Milano nr. 183983/5281/33 Soggetta ad attivita' di direzione e coordinamento di INTEL CORPORATION, USA This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review or distribution by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender and delete all copies.
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Re: The "quick and easy" approach as alternative to the hybrid approach
Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...>
Hi Lukas
toggle quoted messageShow quoted text
-----Original Message----- From: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...> Sent: Friday, May 28, 2021 4:14 PM To: Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...> Cc: safety-architecture@... Subject: Re: [ELISA Safety Architecture WG] The "quick and easy" approach as alternative to the hybrid approach
On Fri, May 28, 2021 at 3:29 PM Paoloni, Gabriele <gabriele.paoloni@...> wrote:
I would propose a very simple "quick and easy" approach to architecture to comply with "safety standard X". (X may be replaced
by
any standard that meets assumption (1) below.)
Assumptions: (1) Safety standard X demands the existence of an architecture for a safety-critical software. (2) Every software once implemented has by definition an
architecture.
Conclusion: A software once implemented fulfils the demand of the safety standard X.
Due to the discussion on the hybrid approach, I finally discovered this very quick and easy approach to claim compliance with the "architecture clause of the safety standard X". This will help me a lot. Thanks for all the support. I do not see how this 'quick and easy' approach can be related to the hybrid approach since the latter implies a safety analysis on the derived architecture.
Thanks, I think that I now understand that the safety analysis is the core; so given a reasonable understanding of the functionality and a bit of kernel expertise, the safety analysis could potentially be done without any artefacts that the hybrid approach currently foresees to "generate" as preparational step to the safety analysis. So, the From my experience a safety analysis based exclusively on expert judgement (hence without a supporting arch design doc) is hardly acceptable
Well, from my experience, the only key criteria for a safety analysis is expert knowledge and expert judgement; all criteria on formality can be met independently of the behaviour, risks and complexity of the actual system by any stringent organizational support, without affecting the content of the technical claims derived, i.e., the conclusions of the safety analysis. So, all supporting material is only to show evidence for the experts' knowledge of the system and to serve as communication means among them to show and ensure equal expert knowledge. Hence, a supporting arch design document is useless if it has not been manually created by the involved experts in alignment and with the goal to be used as evidence that the involved experts during the execution of the safety analysis have deeper knowledge about the system.
If I understand the approach right, you envision the supporting arch design document to be created pretty automatically and hence show that the expertise of the involved experts for the safety analysis is on-par to what a basic (knowingly incomplete) source code analysis can derive; I think that can serve as a good basis for the proof of competence of the involved experts. With that at hand, then you can quickly also just execute the safety analysis and you are done. This sounds like a good plan to quickly and easily achieve compliance. I propose you continue that approach with precisely that goal in mind. Nope, arch design doc is not created automatically. It is computer aided but not automatic. More specifically the communication diagrams (static views of SW units blocks communicating with each other) is automatic, however the dynamic behavior (described by the sequence diagram or automata diagram and kernel-doc headers) is based on manual creation with some computer aided design. Once we have the design doc, this is used to evaluate the current design against the allocated safety reqs, possible failure modes, the effects and existing or possible mitigations. Finally the design doc can be used to derive and assess a test campaign and runtime verification monitors are used to spot defects either in the code or in the model (that as I said are done manually). So I don’t think that this approach is so 'quick and easy'... Thanks Gab
Lukas
--------------------------------------------------------------------- INTEL CORPORATION ITALIA S.p.A. con unico socio Sede: Milanofiori Palazzo E 4 CAP 20094 Assago (MI) Capitale Sociale Euro 104.000,00 interamente versato Partita I.V.A. e Codice Fiscale 04236760155 Repertorio Economico Amministrativo n. 997124 Registro delle Imprese di Milano nr. 183983/5281/33 Soggetta ad attivita' di direzione e coordinamento di INTEL CORPORATION, USA This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review or distribution by others is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender and delete all copies.
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